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I. INTRODUCTION 
Microfinance primarily refers to the making of small loans to low-income 
individuals and the poor, to enable them to start or expand small businesses.
1
  
Currently, most microfinance loans are made through nonprofit microfinance 
institutions (MFIs) that receive donor money.
2
  However, donor-funded loans 
can account for only a small portion of the need.  Microfinance analysts 
estimate, for example, that total market potential is $300 billion,
3
 of which only 
ten percent is currently being captured.
4
  Increasingly, the shortfall in funding is 
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 1. Neil MacFarquhar, Banks Making Big Profits from Tiny Loans, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
13, 2010, at A1 (describing how Muhammad Yunus, who recently won the Nobel Prize in 
2006 for conceiving of microfinance, and others have noticed how banks and financial 
institutions now dominate the microfinance field, with some banks charging the poor very 
high interest rates).  
2.  Steven L. Schwarcz, Disintermediating Avarice: An Inquiry into Commercially 
Sustainable Microfinance, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 3), 
available at 
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1024&context=working_papers. 
 3. Harald Hüttenrauch & Claudia Schneider, Securitisation: A Funding Alternative 
for Microfinance Institutions, in NEW PARTNERSHIPS FOR INNOVATION IN MICROFINANCE 299, 
322 (Ingrid Matthäus-Maier & J.D. von Pishke eds., 2008) (estimating that total demand for 
microloans exceed $300 billion).  
 4. Drew Tulchin, Positioning Microfinance Institutions for the Capital Markets 1 
(Soc. Enters. Assocs., Working Paper No. 5, 2004).  Standard & Poor’s has estimated that of 
the one-and-a-half billion people potentially eligible for microfinance loans, only one 
hundred million people—less than seven percent—receive them. STANDARD & POOR’S, 
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being met by commercial banks.
5
  But commercial-bank intermediation is 
expensive, with a global average effective interest rate (on commercial 
microfinance loans) reported to be as high as thirty-seven percent.
6
  
I have separately argued that microfinance lending can benefit through 
securitization.
7
  Securitization envisions the creation of a special-purpose 
vehicle (“SPV,” sometimes called a special-purpose entity or SPE) that 
effectively replaces commercial banks as intermediaries of funds from capital 
market sources (such replacement being called “disintermediation”).  Unlike 
commercial banks, the SPV is not intended to be profit-making.
8
  The SPV 
issues securities to capital market investors
9
 and uses the proceeds to acquire 
rights to payment, which are intangibles, under loans, leases, and other 
financial assets.  These intangible rights, in turn, constitute the source of 
repayment of the SPV’s securities.
10
 
Securitization can be applied to microfinance in two ways.
11
  The more 
straightforward way, which to some extent is already occurring, is to securitize 
an MFI’s donor-funded microfinance loans in order to regenerate funding for 
 
MICROFINANCE: TAKING ROOT IN THE GLOBAL CAPITAL MARKETS 9 (2007). 
 5. MacFarquhar, supra note 1. 
 6. Id. (reporting “a global average of about 37 percent in interest and fees”). 
 7. Schwarcz, supra note 2 (manuscript at 6).  
 8. See, e.g., Comm. on Bankr. & Corporate Reorganization, N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n, New 
Developments in Structured Finance, 56 BUS. LAW. 95, 132 (2000) (observing that SPVs are 
not intended to profit, so taxes should not be an issue).  
 9. These investors are usually located in major money centers. But cf. Hüttenrauch 
& Schneider, supra note 3, at 323 & n.49 (observing that ProCredit Bank AD, Bulgaria was 
able to issue microfinance-loan-backed bonds in local markets); Susan Davis & Rod 
Dubitsky, Microfinance Meets Wall Street, FORBES (Mar. 26, 2008, 6:00 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/2008/03/22/brac-microfinance-creditsuisse-oped-
cx_sdrd_0326brac.html (describing how BRAC, led by Citibank, issued microfinance-loan-
backed securities locally in Bangladesh).  Some SPVs are located in Luxembourg because of 
its favorable securitization laws that allow a single SPV to carry out many different 
transactions by multiple, legally separated groups within the same SPV. Christopher J. 
Carolan & Madeleine M.L. Tan, Microfinance & Securitization: A Profitable Partnership 
for Socioeconomic Development, INT’L SECURITIZATION & FIN. REP., Apr. 15, 2008, at 12. 
 10. For a more complete discussion of securitization, including the transactional 
steps mentioned above, see generally STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE: A GUIDE 
TO THE PRINCIPLES OF ASSET SECURITIZATION (3d. ed.2007 & Supp. 2010) [hereinafter 
STRUCTURED FINANCE]; Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J. 
L. BUS. & FIN. 133 (1994).  Securitization is economically efficient when the interest-rate 
cost saving achieved through this disintermediation more than offsets the transaction costs of 
the securitization. Id. at 137-38 (observing that transaction costs, which include the cost of 
creating the SPV and sometimes also the cost of obtaining a rating on its securities, can vary 
over a wide range depending on the securitization structure). 
11. Schwarcz, supra note 2 (manuscript at 8). 
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the MFI to make additional loans (“regenerative securitization”).
12
  A more 
innovative way would be to fund new microfinance lending through the capital 
markets without expensive commercial-bank intermediation (“transformative 
securitization”).
13
  
II. THE PROBLEM 
Either form of securitization, however, faces a problem under commercial 
law.  To successfully securitize microfinance loans, the MFI originating the 
loans would have to transfer the loans to the SPV. That transfer will often have 
to constitute a sale.
14
  
The law governing that transfer will likely depend on the MFI’s location.
15
  
For MFIs located in the United States, United States law would apply.
16
  But 
for an MFI located in Country X, the law of Country X would likely be 
applicable.
17
  In that case, investors would want to ensure that the transfer of 
the microfinance loans is protected from creditors of the MFI under the law of 
Country X.  Country X could well be the country where the end-borrowers are 
located if, for example, the MFI must be locally licensed there to make the 
loans.  
III. PERFECTION AND PRIORITY 
That calls into question whether Country X law is sufficiently developed to 
address the sale or other transfer of intangible rights like microfinance loans—
which are essentially rights to payment—and, if so, whether the SPV or the 
MFI is required to take steps to protect or “perfect” the transfer.  The rationale 
for requiring protective steps is to prevent the transfer of intangible rights from 
 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Steven L. Schwarcz, The Universal Language of International Securitization, 12 
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 285, 291 (2002). 
 15. UNITED NATIONS, U.N. CONVENTION ON THE ASSIGNMENT OF RECEIVABLES IN 
INT’L TRADE, at 15, U.N. Sales No. E.04.V.14 (2004), available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/payments/receivables/ctc-assignment-convention-
e.pdf [hereinafter U.N. CONVENTION] (making the law of the transferor’s jurisdiction 
applicable when determining priority of claimants’ rights to receivables); see U.C.C. 
§§ 9-301(1), 9-305(c) (2008) (the location of the transferor determines the jurisdiction whose 
law governs perfection); Schwarcz, supra note 14, at 292.  
 16. Schwarcz, supra note 2 (manuscript at 23). 
17. Id. 
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being regarded as fraudulent vis-à-vis third parties, such as creditors of the 
MFI, who cannot actually see the transfer.
18
  
In the United States, a transfer of intangible rights is normally perfected by 
filing, in a public registry, a description of the transferred assets.
19
  In many 
other countries, however, perfection procedures for transferring intangible 
rights, when they exist, are unclear or impractical—such as requiring the 
obligors on the intangible rights (in our case, the borrowers on the microfinance 
loans) to be notified of the transfer.
20
  Moreover, in countries where transfers 
are perfected without public registration or some other form of objectively 
ascertainable public notice, a transferee—in our case, the SPV—cannot know 
that its interest in the intangible rights will have priority over third-party 
interests.
21
  This can create a fraud risk, enabling a transferor to purport to 
transfer the same rights to multiple parties.
22
  Perfection procedures that are 
unclear or impractical or that enable fraud will discourage commercial transfers 
of intangible rights,
23
 thereby discouraging securitization of microfinance 
loans. 
In Ghana and the Philippines, for example, the perfection requirement “has 
emerged as a substantial constraint to rural credit access.”
24
  Determining if 
there are prior superior claims on assets pledged as collateral can also be very 
difficult in Latin America.
25
  In Uruguay, a transferee cannot search records by 
the name of the transferor but must know the date of any prior transfer.
26
  In 
Bolivia, a transferee of intangible rights must look through an entire registry to 
determine if there have been prior transfers that have priority.
27
  Many other 
 
 18. See, e.g., Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353 (1925) (examining whether transfers 
of intangible rights can be fraudulent, creating “secret liens”).  
 19. See U.C.C. § 9-310 (requiring the filing of financing statements for perfection). 
 20. Schwarcz, supra note 14, at 292-93. 
 21. Id. at 293. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 294.  For an analysis of public registration for transfers of intangible rights, 
see Steven L. Schwarcz, Towards a Centralized Perfection System for Cross-Border 
Receivables Financing, 20 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 455 (1999). 
 24. Joselito Gallardo, A Framework for Regulating Microfinance Institutions: The 
Experience in Ghana and the Philippines 31 (The World Bank, Working Paper No. 2755, 
2002). 
 25. Glenn D. Westley, Can Financial Market Policies Reduce Income Inequality? 32 
(Inter-Am. Dev. Bank, Sustainable Dev. Dep’t Technical Papers Series No. MSM-112, 
2001), available at http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/128760/Can%20 
Financial%20Markets%20Reduce%20Income%20Inequality.pdf. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
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Latin American countries have even less developed transfer mechanisms.
28
  
The problem has become so important that The World Bank is attempting to 
address it.
29
 
These problems could be exacerbated when microfinance loans are 
transferred as part of a securitization. Microfinance loans are often made to 
individuals in a neighborhood peer group, who jointly and severally become 
obligated for repayment.
30
  Also, because microfinance loans are typically 
made in small amounts, a commercially viable securitization may have to 
include thousands of microfinance loans to offset transaction costs.  If the 
relevant MFI’s jurisdiction requires notification of obligors for perfection, that 
would require many thousands of notices. 
This essay next examines how the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) in 
the United States facilitates the transfer of intangible rights—an approach that, 
with principled modifications, other nations might consider examining in order 
to help facilitate the securitization of microfinance loans.  
IV. THE UNITED STATES LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
In the United States and, in the author’s experience, also in many other 
countries, transfers of intangible rights are generally regarded as either sales or 
transfers for security.
31
  Article 9 of the UCC governs transfers for security of 
 
 28. See id.; cf. SWATI R. GHOSH, EAST ASIAN FINANCE 19 (2006) (finding that 
Singapore, Hong Kong, and Malaysia have adequate legal frameworks for securitization). 
 29. See Arnold S. Rosenberg, Where to File Against Non-U.S. Debtors: Applying 
UCC § 9-307(c)[Rev] to Foreign Filing, Recording, and Registration Systems, 39 UCC L.J. 
109, 262 (2006) (noting that The World Bank considers a filing system important to 
securitization and “continue[s] to pressure debtor countries to establish filing systems and a 
supporting legal framework”); Gallardo, supra note 24, at 4 (observing that The World Bank 
has been helping countries to adopt comprehensive legal frameworks for transferring 
intangible rights, including modernizing registry systems); GLOBAL FIN. MKTS. DEP’T, INT’L 
FIN. CORP., SECURITISATION IN RUSSIA (2005), available at 
http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/home.nsf/Content/Securitization_in_Russia (reporting the findings 
and advice of a World Bank Group delegation that advised Russia in drafting new 
securitization laws). 
 30. Beatriz Armendáriz de Aghion & Jonathan Morduch, Microfinance Beyond 
Group Lending, 8 ECON. OF TRANSITION 401, 402 (2000) (describing group lending as a 
practice by MFIs that is “typically comprised of three to seven neighbours”); Begoña 
Gutiérrez-Nietoa, Carlos Serrano-Cinca & Cecilio Mar Molinerob, Microfinance Institutions 
and Efficiency, 35 OMEGA 131, 132 (2007); cf. Klaus Abbink, Bernd Irlenbusch & Elke 
Renner, Group Size and Social Ties in Microfinance Institutions, 44 ECON. INQUIRY 614, 
615-16 (2006) (stating how MFIs, when adopting jointly-obligated schemes, must balance 
insuring individual risks against an individual’s reliance on other borrowers to repay the 
loans that gives the individual an incentive to free-ride). 
 31. There can be, of course, other types of transfers, such as transfers in trust or into 
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most assets, including intangible rights.  Article 9’s basic function is to perfect 
and give priority, in a simple and low-cost manner, to these transfers.  It 
normally accomplishes this, as mentioned, by having a party to the transfer file 
a description of the transferred assets with a public registry.
32
  Once so filed, 
the transferee secured by the assets (the “secured party”) can determine its 
priority by examining if there are any other filings describing those assets.
33
  
Transferees who file first obtain first priority (often referred to as first-in-time, 
first-in-right).
34
  
More significant to this essay, the UCC expands Article 9’s perfection-and-
priority filing system to also cover transfers of intangible rights
35
 that constitute 
sales, not merely transfers for security.
36
  This expansion was intended to bring 
these sales within the UCC’s simple and low-cost perfection and priority rules 
that govern secured transactions.
37
  The rationale for doing this was to facilitate 
modern commercial finance, including securitization, in which sales of 
intangible rights are critical.
38
  Thus, under Article 9, sales of these intangible 
rights were intended to be perfected and to obtain priority in the same manner 
as if those sales were transfers as security—simply by filing a financing 
statement in a public recording system (“notice filing”).  This is the principle 
that—as applied to sales of intangible rights—should inform microfinance, as 
discussed below. 
 
escrow. 
 32. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
33. U.C.C. § 9-322 (2008). 
 34. U.C.C. § 9-322 (2008). 
 35. More precisely, intangible rights for the payment of money. 
 36. See U.C.C. § 9-109(a)(3) (2008). 
 37. See PERMANENT EDITORIAL BD. FOR THE U.C.C., COMMENTARY NO. 14 (SECTION 
9-102(1)(b)) FINAL DRAFT (June 10, 1994) (explaining that the “reason for subjecting both 
sales and secured transactions to [UCC] Article 9 was to inform third parties of existing 
interests in a debtor’s receivables and to provide protection for all types of assignments of 
receivables”; and adding a paragraph to Official Comment 2 to section 9-102 to explain that 
“Article 9 applies . . . to sales of [intangible rights] primarily to incorporate Article’s 9’s 
perfection rules”).  
 38. Cf. Schwarcz, supra note 23, at 455 (observing that intangible rights may 
constitute one of the largest categories of assets transferred in cross-border financing).  An 
Official Comment to UCC section 9-109 states that the scope rule of subsection (a)(3) 
thereof is intended to “avoid[] difficult problems of distinguishing between transactions in 
which a receivable secures an obligation and those in which the receivable has been sold 
outright. . . . [Because] [i]n many commercial financing transactions the distinction is 
blurred.” U.C.C. § 9-109 cmt. 4 (2008).  This rationale is not completely convincing, 
however, because anyone having any question as to whether a given transaction is a secured 
transfer or a sale could always perfect as if it were a secured transaction. 
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There is, however, a technical caveat.  Due to what I believe were 
misguided lobbying efforts,
39
 the 2001 revisions to UCC Article 9 undermined 
the notice-filing principle by providing, in new sections 9-309(3) & (4), that 
sales of “payment intangibles” and of promissory notes are “perfected when 
they attach,” meaning they are perfected automatically without the need to file 
financing statements in a public registry.
40
  Payment intangibles and 
promissory notes are terms that, if applied to microfinance, would include most 
if not all microfinance loans.
41
  
Automatic perfection, like notice filing, makes it feasible to sell intangible 
rights.
42
  However, automatic perfection, unlike notice filing, prevents 
transferees, such as an SPV, from knowing whether its interest in the purchased 
intangible rights will have priority over third-party interests, creating a fraud 
risk.
43
  My article advocates that microfinance should be informed by applying 
the notice-filing principle of the UCC—not the distortion of that principle 
created by automatic perfection—to sales of intangible rights.  
V. APPLICATION TO MICROFINANCE 
To control lending costs, local MFIs with knowledge about the 
microfinance borrowing community typically must originate microfinance 
loans.
44
  They therefore would be selling these loans to SPVs.
45
  The law of the 
nation where a microfinance borrowing community, and thus the loan-
originating MFI, is located would thus govern perfection of the sale of those 
loans.
46
  
Nations that wish to expand the availability of low-cost microfinance 
lending to their local communities are therefore the very nations that should 
consider perfecting sales of intangible rights through notice filing. A nation 
could do this merely by enacting a law that enables sales of microfinance loans 
 
 39. See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, The Impact on Securitization of Revised UCC 
Article 9, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 947 (1999) (contributing to that Law Review’s Symposium 
on Revised Uniform Commercial Code Article 9, I explain why those lobbying efforts were 
misguided).  
 40. See U.C.C. § 9-309 cmt. 4 (2008).  
 41. Where microfinance loans are not evidenced by promissory notes, the intangible 
rights to payment under the loan agreements would constitute payment intangibles. See 
U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(61) (2008). 
 42. Compare supra text accompanying notes 19-20 (discussing unclear or 
impractical perfection procedures for transferring intangible rights). 
 43. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text. 
 44. Schwarcz, supra note 2 (manuscript at 26-28). 
 45. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 46. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
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to be perfected—that is, protected from creditors of the transferor—by a simple 
and low-cost filing in a public recording system.   
There are other possible approaches.  For example, drafters of the United 
Nations Convention on the Assignment of Receivables in International Trade 
(the “UN Convention”) were unable to reach consensus on substantive rules for 
establishing perfection and priority of cross-border transfers of intangible 
rights, addressing these issues instead through conflict-of-laws rules.
47
  The UN 
Convention makes the law of the assignor’s location govern perfection and 
priority disputes,
48
 but it also offers a choice among three substantive law 
priority systems: filing in a public recording system (in the Convention called a 
“notice-filing system”), a notification-of-the-debtor system, and a system based 
on the time of conclusion of the contract of assignment.
49
  A public recording 
system, however, would avoid the notification-of-the-debtor problems that are 
exacerbated by microfinance securitization
50
 and would also avoid the potential 
for fraud that is created by a system, such as time-of-conclusion-of-the-
contract-of-assignment, that does not require objectively ascertainable public 
notice.
51
 
 
 47. U.N. CONVENTION, supra note 15, at 40-41.  
 48. See Spiros V. Bazinas, Multi-Jurisdictional Receivables Financing: 
UNCITRAL’s Impact on Securitization and Cross-Border Perfection, 12 DUKE J. COMP. & 
INT’L L. 365, 380 (2002).  Location is defined by the assignor’s place of business, and if the 
assignor does business in more than one country then the location is the assignor’s place of 
central administration (principal place of business). U.N. CONVENTION, supra note 15, at 32. 
 49. Bazinas, supra note 48, at 383.  
 50. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text. 
 51. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text. 
